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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
CONF

1 OF 1

12 SEPT 1973

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F B I S

TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

STATSPEC



Confidential

12 SEPTEMBER 1973
(VOL. XXIV, NO. 37)

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INDOCHINA

LAO FRONT SCORED DELAYS PRIOR TO INITIALING OF PROTOCOL

Two recent statements from the Lao Patriotic Front (LPF) revealed some aspects of the tortuous negotiations leading to the initialing, on 12 September, of the protocol on the implementation of the 21 February Vientiane peace agreement. Both statements, issued by the LPF secretary general and LPF Central Committee on 4 and 7 September respectively, accused the United States and the Royal Lao Government (RLG) of delaying agreement. The statements differed somewhat, however, in their accounts of exchanges surrounding several alleged LPF concessions.*

Both LPF statements admonished Premier Souvanna Phouma for permitting the "Sananikone ultrarightists" faction in his government to undermine the negotiations; but the U.S. Government and the "pro-U.S. reactionaries in Laos" were charged with the main responsibility for the stalemate. Secretary General Phoumi Vongvichit, the ranking LPF negotiator, contended in his statement that U.S. Charge d'Affaires John Dean and RLG Premier Souvanna Phouma had reneged on assurances that a draft protocol, agreed upon following LPF concessions on 27 July, would be signed. The Central Committee statement did not reiterate Phoumi's charge that Dean and Souvanna had gone back on their promise; however, it disclosed that, in addition to the concessions on 27 July, the LPF had made further concessions in meetings with Souvanna on 23 and 24 August, following demands put forth by the Premier on the 15th.

The two LPF statements chronicled the Front's concessions in the following areas:

+ Deputy premiers: Both statements indicated that in the 27 July concessions the LPF agreed to the creation of two deputy premier posts, with a "first" deputy to be chosen by the LPF and a "second" deputy to be chosen by the RLG. Phoumi added that the Sananikone faction was demanding that the two deputy premiers enjoy equal rank; but only the Central Committee statement revealed that the LPF acceded to this demand on 23-24 August, with the qualification that the LPF deputy premier would exercise the premier's powers in his

* The last previous authoritative LPF statement on the negotiations was a 31 May Central Committee memorandum reviewing the progress of the talks after the first 100 days. (See the TRENDS of 6 June 1973, pages 7-9.)

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absence. The February agreement contained no provision for a deputy premier, but the LPF has consistently agitated for the right to fill the number-two position in the government, assuming that Souvanna would be the premier.

+ Ministers: The LPF claimed that agreement had been reached by the end of July on the division of cabinet posts in the new government, with each side assigned control of five ministries. The agreement, according to the Central Committee statement, was the result of Front concession to the RLG on 27 July of the choice of the ministers of interior and education. The ministries of defense, finance, and health were also to be assigned to the Vientiane side. Phoumi pointed up the extent of the Front concessions when he noted that "three out of the four important portfolios" had been given to the RLG.

The Central Committee statement also listed the proposed LPF-controlled ministries: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Information, Propaganda, and Tourism; Ministry of Economy and Planning; Ministry of Communications and Public Works; and Ministry of Culture. Neutral ministers were slated to head the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications.

+ Boundary markers: The 27 July concessions also were said to include LPF agreement that the number of markers delineating the cease-fire line could be reduced from 32 to 27. Phoumi complained that the Sananikone faction wanted to omit two more markers; but it was left to the Central Committee statement to acknowledge that the LPF in August apparently bowed to this demand and agreed to the placement of only 25 markers. LPF media had earlier criticized the RLG for trying to obtain approval for the deployment of joint military teams in LPF-controlled territory.

+ Military forces in capitals: Phoumi indicated that at the end of July the LPF also had agreed to cut by two-thirds the size of the military force the Front had proposed to station in Vientiane and Luang Prabang. The Central Committee statement did not list this point among the 27 July concessions; but it revealed that the July agreement had stipulated that each side would station 1,000 policemen in Vientiane and 500 in Luang Prabang, and that each would contribute "an equal number of troops with equivalent equipment" to a battalion defending Vientiane and two companies defending Luang Prabang. The LPF had pushed hard for the right to station policemen and troops in the two cities in order to insure the "safety" of government officials--a demand related to the assassination of an LPF cabinet minister during a previous coalition government.

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+ U.S. aid: Phoumi charged that after the 27 July protocol had been agreed upon, the Sananikone faction urged that the provision on U.S. contributions to the post-war reconstruction of Laos be cancelled. He did not indicate that any subsequent changes were made on this point; but the Central Committee statement revealed that the LPF's concessions on 23-24 August included agreement to alter the language of this point in the protocol: The 27 July draft protocol, as reported by the Central Committee statement, stipulated that the new provisional government "will discuss" U.S. contributions to the healing of the wounds of war and to the post-war reconstruction in Laos. In August the LPF reportedly agreed to vaguer language providing that the LPF and RLG would "promote the provisional national union government to carry out" the provisions of the February agreement on U.S. aid.

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SIHANOUK REJECTS COMPROMISE; NCNA SCORES LON NOL-USSR TIES

With further developments in Cambodia now apparently hinging on the outcome of military action, comment by Sihanouk's Front and his Peking and Hanoi allies has assumed a time-marking character. Sihanouk and his principal Front spokesmen have maintained an intransigent position on the question of a settlement and have reaffirmed determination to gain control of the entire country. However, insurgent forecasts of the imminent collapse of the Phnom Penh administration, common in propaganda at the time of the mid-August U.S. bombing halt, have steadily declined. Addressing the nonaligned nations' summit conference on 6 September, Sihanouk lambasted the Nixon Administration for continued interference in Cambodia, claimed that over 20,000 Saigon and Bangkok troops are currently in Cambodia supporting Lon Nol, and ruled out a settlement short of RGNU control of the country. A statement from the RGNU prime minister's office, broadcast by the insurgent's radio on the 5th, more bluntly affirmed that the Front will never have contact or enter into negotiation with the Phnom Penh government.

Both Peking and Hanoi have maintained their low posture of recent weeks, originating little comment on Cambodian developments. Peking has continued its practice of replaying major Front statements, but recently has heavily edited insurgent pronouncements that have raised issues related to broader Chinese interests. Most notably, NCNA's abbreviated replay of Sihanouk's 6 September address in Algiers deleted all criticism of the Nixon Administration by name, the claim that the United States was behind his overthrow in 1970, and allegations about Thai and Saigon troop support.

PEKING CRITICISM OF USSR POSITION While softpedaling Sihanouk's criticism of the United States and its allies, Peking has predictably given full play to his recent attacks on the Soviet Union. Thus, NCNA on 7 September reported Sihanouk's impromptu remarks that day in which he disputed Cuban Prime Minister Castro's characterization of the Soviet Union as the friend of oppressed nations by noting Moscow's continued ties with Lon Nol and refusal to recognize the RGNU. Peking's first comment on recent Soviet efforts to pose as a consistent supporter of Sihanouk's Front came in a 9 September NCNA correspondent's report which charged Moscow with perfidy toward Cambodia. NCNA assailed the USSR for refusing military aid to the insurgents, attempting to bring about a compromise political settlement of the war contrary to the Front's objectives, granting economic assistance to Lon Nol,

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and refusing to break ties with Lon Nol or withdraw its diplomats from Phnom Penh in conformity with Sihanouk's 10 August statement to foreign embassies in Cambodia. Bitterly castigating Soviet intentions, Peking charged that Moscow is sticking with Lon Nol's regime so as to use it as a tool for future intervention in Cambodia and expansion into Southeast Asia. In this connection, NCNA quoted a Thai official for the observation that Moscow covets Cambodian port facilities, particularly in Kompong Som, adding in its own name that the recent outpouring of Soviet calls for Asian collective security in the wake of the Vietnam war is designed to encourage the replacement of the "hegemony" of the United States in the area with that of the Soviet Union.

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NONALINED CONFERENCE

MOSCOW AFFIRMS IDENTITY WITH NONALINED CAUSE, REBUTS PEKING

Moscow's coverage of the fourth nonalined summit conference, held in Algiers 5-9 September, focused on countering Peking's efforts aimed at changing the "anti-imperialist orientation" of the third world and rendering it equally opposed to the capitalist world and the Soviet bloc. Soviet media denounced the "absurd pseudotheory" of dividing the world into rich and poor countries as a misguided attempt to convince the nonalined states of a "superpower conspiracy" against their interests. Moscow complained that this dichotomy ignored class distinctions between the developed capitalist and socialist countries, as well as the class content of the nonalined movement. The Soviet definition of nonalinement as anti-imperialist and, by implication, anti-Western is consistent with Moscow's comment on previous nonalined summit conferences.

BREZHNEV MESSAGE The thrust of the Soviet position was set by Brezhnev himself in a message to conference host Boumediene on the eve of the conference--a message publicized by Algerian media on 1 September but not acknowledged in Soviet media.* In his letter Brezhnev warned of "imperialist" and "reactionary" attempts to water down the anti-imperialist content of the nonalined movement, prevent expansion of the "zone of detente" and set the nonalined countries against the socialist states, thereby depriving them of their "natural and most reliable allies." Brezhnev also rejected the concept of dividing the world into rich and poor states--an implicit swipe at the Algerian president, who had declared in a late August interview with the Belgrade BORBA that unbalanced economic relations between the industrialized powers and the developing states were a chief preoccupation of the nonalined countries.

The formal message of greetings from Podgorny and Kosygin to the conference itself, carried by TASS on the 4th, conveyed in bland fashion Moscow's view that positive trends in the world benefited all peoples and pledged continuing Soviet cooperation with the developing countries. Moscow predictably publicized remarks by conference speakers appreciative of the USSR or consistent with Soviet positions, giving extensive attention to Castro's speech on the 7th in defense of Soviet policy and condemnation of the United States. Castro's "sharp criticism" of "pseudorevolutionaries" was

* Czechoslovak and GDR dispatches from Algiers on 1 September curiously hailed Brezhnev's message, CTK citing "political observers" as attaching great importance to the letter.

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repeatedly employed to rebut the speech by Libya's al-Qadhdhafi, the target of periodic Soviet criticism for his anticommunist views. Coverage of the conference proceedings also underlined the participants' concern with economic questions, depicting speakers as seeking the economic liberation of their countries from the domination of "imperialist monopolies" and the establishment of national control over their natural resources.

POLEMIC WITH PEKING A particular effort to counteract Peking's anti-Soviet line before a largely sympathetic audience was evident both in Brezhnev's message and in the spate of Soviet commentary on the conference. Although the Soviet leader did not point an accusing finger directly at Peking, he complained about attempts to place the Soviet Union "on the same footing" as the "most important capitalist countries," a prominent element in China's anti-Soviet propaganda. A PRAVDA article by Orestov on 1 September enlarged on the Brezhnev thesis by warning that "some people" in the nonaligned states had been influenced by Peking and as a result were downgrading the campaign against imperialism and engaging in activities harmful to the beneficial relations between nonaligned countries and the socialist states headed by the Soviet Union.

Moscow also attempted to tarnish Peking's third world credentials. A PRAVDA article by K. Brutents on 30 August boasted that the actions of the "Maoist leadership" against Soviet detente policies had not met with the expected response in the nonaligned countries, and a 5 September IZVESTIYA article by G. Bondarevskiy and V. Sofinskiy accused "the Maoists" of acting "as the shameless enemies of the nonalignment movement." Less authoritative comment raised doubts about Peking's dedication to anti-imperialism by pointing out that Chinese policies "coincided in many respects" with those of the capitalist states. Several broadcasts to international audiences also charged that Peking had tried to prevent the adoption of "constructive" decisions at the conference. Moscow termed "a gross lie" and a "slandorous concept" the reference to "superpower hegemonism" in Chinese Premier Chou En-lai's message to the nonaligned conference. Peking was also accused of having taken up policies pursued by John Foster Dulles and his followers concerning "great and small, rich and poor countries."

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Assessing the results of the conference, PRAVDA acknowledged on the 10th that there were differences of opinion during the conference stemming from varying foreign and domestic policies, but maintained that debates brought out a "certain degree of unity or similarity" of positions.

PEKING STRESSES DIVERGENCES BETWEEN MOSCOW AND THIRD WORLD

Peking devoted considerably greater attention to the Algiers conference than it had to the last nonaligned summit in Lusaka in 1970, reflecting the intensification of Chinese efforts to undermine the Soviet Union in the third world. As in 1970, Chou En-lai sent a congratulatory message stressing the increasingly important role being played in international affairs by nonaligned nations, especially in the struggle against "big-power hegemonism." In keeping with past practice, Peking will presumably assess the results of the conclave in a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial in the next few days.

While duly reporting speeches and resolutions at the conference condemning the United States on such issues as Vietnam and Cambodia, the Chinese took special pains to support the complaints voiced by some of the conferees that the Soviet Union does not represent the interests of the developing nations but is engaged in competition with the United States at their expense. Notably, an 8 September NCNA article based on Western press sources reported the indignant reactions of the conferees to Brezhnev's message to Algerian President Boumedienne on the eve of the conference. The article pointedly criticized the Brezhnev message as a "crude attempt" to influence the deliberations of the conference and likened it to the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. The presence of Soviet tanks in Prague as well as the B-52 bombings of Hanoi were treated in the article as proof of the collusion of the superpowers in disregard of the interests of smaller nations.

The determined Chinese effort to tar the Soviet Union was evident in the treatment of Castro's 7 September speech defending Moscow and scoring "those who speak about two imperialisms." Reporting the address without comment, a lengthy NCNA account described the ensuing contretemps at the session as evidence of wide disapproval among the participants of the Cuban leader's stance. Thus NCNA reported that all lights in the conference hall "suddenly went out" during Castro's speech, and that Cambodian Prince Sihanouk interrupted the proceedings to ask Castro to have Moscow

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prove its intentions toward the third world by establishing relations with his government and breaking ties with Lon Nol. NCNA pointedly observed that "warm applause" greeted Sihanouk at the close of his remarks. Peking also disclosed that Libyan Chairman al-Qadhafi walked out of the session during Castro's speech, and quoted the Libyan leader as stating that Castro is a Soviet ally and therefore speaks in defense of Soviet interests and that "the Soviet Union is world imperialism, the same as the United States."

EAST EUROPEAN MAVERICKS OFFER FAMILIAR VIEWS ON CONFERENCE

While Moscow's orthodox allies in East Europe followed its lead, Yugoslavia, Romania and Albania offered independent assessments of third world developments. Tito, the only representative of a European socialist state to attend the conference, hailed the progress of the nonaligned movement--with Yugoslavia an integral part--in his speech to the gathering; Romania's Ceausescu implicitly identified his country with the aims of the movement; and Tirana used the occasion for new attacks on Moscow and Washington.

YUGOSLAVIA In a speech marked by bland generalities at the opening session of the conference, Yugoslav President Tito stressed the growth of the nonaligned movement as a major factor in relaxation of international tensions. In particular, he noted that Europe "is no longer a hotbed of any immediate danger of war," a trend evidenced by the European security conference. He balanced this assessment, however, with a reminder about the unevenness of the positive trends in world affairs and the continued role of force as a "dominant" factor in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and parts of Africa and Latin America.

In contrast to his speech at the Lusaka conference in 1970, which had been heavily conditioned by the Czechoslovak invasion, Tito stuck to generalities on the score of pressure by the great powers on smaller countries. Thus after noting the weakening of "bloc polarization," he merely urged that nonaligned countries strengthen their solidarity and mutual support "in case" one of them is threatened or "exposed to foreign pressure." Without mentioning Moscow or Washington, as he had in Lusaka, Tito advised the third world to shape its own destiny and not to rely on the great powers "even when they are motivated by the best intentions."

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While halting the progress of detente, Tito deplored the "absurd" situation in which the development of science and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were actually widening the gulf between the developed and developing countries. To counter this trend he urged that the nonaligned countries step up their cooperation in utilization of their "vast sources of power and raw materials" in order to be able to deal with the developed countries "in a more organized way."

Tito was somewhat more specific in an interview for Algerian television on the 9th, the conference's last day. As reported by TANJUG the same day, he remarked that, in contrast to the tense atmosphere prevailing at the time of the first nonaligned conference in Belgrade in 1961, "today the great powers are talking, and this is something positive." He added that "this is confirmed by Brezhnev's visit to Washington, Nixon's trips to Moscow, China, etc." Declaring that "only one question has been solved, the question of war or peace," he again urged intensification of "organized" economic cooperation among the nonaligned countries based on the large raw material resources at their disposal and their ability to manipulate the prices of such raw materials to their advantage.

ROMANIA As in 1970, Ceausescu used his message to the conference as a vehicle for reiterating the main tenets of Bucharest's independent stance, now updated in cognizance of recent progress toward detente. In his message, carried by AGERPRES in English on the 5th, the Romanian president noted that the conference was taking place at a time of "profound positive political and social mutations" in international affairs. He expressed the hope that the Algiers conference would promote the establishment in international relations of the principles of equal rights, independence and sovereignty, noninterference in internal affairs, "and every people's right to self-dependently decide its economic and social development." Calling European security the key factor in world peace, Ceausescu characteristically stressed that it should be achieved through cooperation of "all states of the continent, irrespective of social system" on the basis of equality. He also called for the liquidation of bases, the removal of troops from foreign territories and the establishment of denuclearized zones, and he urged Moscow--in an appeal ostensibly addressed to the great powers--to refrain from policies of "strength and diktat" and "oppressing and dominating other peoples." Unlike his 1970 greeting, Ceausescu's message avoided any reference to "all socialist states"--a contentious concept intended to embrace Peking.

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ALBANIA An editorial in the 8 September ZERI I POPULLIT predictably denounced the attitudes of Washington and Moscow toward the Algiers conclave. Reserving its main venom for Moscow, the editorial seized on Brezhnev's message to Algerian President Boumediene which had "complained that 'the Soviet socialist state and the big capitalist powers are being placed on the same level.'" Noting that Brezhnev's "threatening" message was not published by Soviet media, ZERI I POPULLIT pointed with satisfaction to a statement by Cambodian Prince Sihanouk at an Algiers press conference that the nonaligned countries want neither threats nor advice and that "we relinquish recognition of our movement by the USSR."

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EAST - WEST RELATIONS

MOSCOW DOWNPLAYS EUROPEAN CRITICISM OF DOMESTIC CRACKDOWN

In line with its effort to deflate the international impact of its domestic crackdown on dissidence, Moscow has presented a highly selective account of West European reactions to the Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn affairs. It has acknowledged in general terms the emergence of a strong Western reaction to these affairs, but it has interpreted this reaction as reflecting resurgent cold war attitudes on the part of opponents of peaceful coexistence. It has been similarly selective in its treatment of West European communist comment, presenting it as reinforcing the Soviet contention that anti-detente forces are supporting the dissidents. The issues of political censorship and intellectual freedom raised in both the communist and non-communist European comment have been predictably ignored by Moscow.

NON-COMMUNIST REACTION A sketchy image of the West European reaction to the Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn affairs has been conveyed in several recent Soviet commentaries. A major article in IZVESTIYA on 4 September, for example, devoted substantial attention to the subject in the context of a sharp attack on Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Characterizing the two radios as instruments of the U. S. "special services," the article asserted that their continued existence contravened not only "the improvement of relations which has begun to emerge among states with different political systems but also generally accepted international legal practice." It asserted that Radio Liberty had recently shown "particular diligence" in disseminating the writings of "so-called dissidents, morally deprived persons" --a characterization which it specifically tied to Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn. In similar vein, a commentary by N. Andreyev, carried by Moscow domestic service on 8 September, denounced the "outcry" raised in the Western press over the Sakharov affair. Ascribing this agitation to anti-Soviet forces that are attempting to "reverse the relaxation of tension," Andreyev asserted that it was intended to create an atmosphere of "psychological pressure" on the Soviet Union with the purpose of gaining concessions.

Soviet media have ignored the statements of support for the dissidents voiced by West German Chancellor Brandt and the U.S. Academy of Sciences. Moscow has alluded indirectly, however, to criticisms of the Soviet domestic crackdown made by Austrian Chancellor Kreisky and Swedish Foreign Minister Wickman on 3

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and 5 September, respectively. TASS on the 8th commented that it was strange that "some statesmen in Sweden and Austria" should have joined their voices to those of the opponents of detente.

COMMUNIST REACTIONS Moscow has reported only selectively on the West European communist reaction to the Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn affairs. It has ignored the formal support for intellectual freedom voiced by the French and Italian communist parties, and has reported only selectively on a few other statements expressing support for the Soviet position.

The French party has been by far the most valuable on commenting on the subject. Pressed to maintain a respectably libertarian image by the requirements of its electoral strategy, as well as by a current press debate concerning the role of intellectuals in a socialist regime,* the PCF has expressed support for the "right" of the Soviet dissidents to voice their criticisms of government policy. In a series of commentaries on the 23d, 24th, and 29th of August, L'HUMANITE balanced this support with an attack on "reactionary forces" hostile to the Soviet policy of detente and to the left alliance in France. On the 29th, the paper declared: "In the socialist France we desire, freedom of opinion and expression will be guaranteed for all, including dissenters. . ." None of these articles have been reported in the Soviet media.

Moscow did report, however, a press statement by PCF Secretary General George Marchais, on 29 August, strongly defending the Soviet position. In his statement, Marchais attempted to downplay the significance of the affair by asserting that only a "dozen names" were involved and that some of them, like Sakharov, had been able to express their views. He went on to say, moreover, that the "methods dating from the time of Stalin's personality cult" had been condemned by the 20th CPSU congress and no longer prevailed in the Soviet Union. TASS in reporting this statement on 30 August deleted the reference to Stalin but retained the more euphemious "personality cult era." PRAVDA's version of the TASS item and a domestic broadcast summarizing Marchais' remarks showed even greater sensitivity about de-Stalinization by deleting the reference to the 20th party congress.

* The dispute has been carried on by PCF member Pierre Daix and Politburo member R. Leroy and has concerned charges made by the former, in a recent book on Solzhenitsyn, that repressive methods continue to be applied in the Soviet Union.

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The Italian party in commenting on the Soviet crackdown was even more outspoken in asserting its commitment to the principle of intellectual freedom. A commentary in L'UNITA on 29 August asserted that "open critical debate" was one of the "indispensable methods by which a society argues about itself." While taking care to reserve for the party the same rights of free debate that it granted to the dissidents, the article did not attack Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn personally, nor did it attempt to downplay the affair by linking it with the agitation of anti-Soviet forces. Moscow has not reported the L'UNITA article.

LINKAGE WITH CSCE Moscow's treatment of the West European reaction to its domestic crackdown has obviously been calculated with the forthcoming Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in mind. Aware that its vulnerabilities on the Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn affairs could expose it to increased pressure for accommodation on the cultural exchange issue at the conference, Moscow has sought to discredit Western criticism by ascribing it to anti-detente motivations. Along with this, it has vigorously reasserted its long-standing position that cultural exchanges are matters to be arranged and regulated by state agencies, not left to the initiative of individual persons. On this point, it has reiterated a principle that could serve as a rationalization for its position at the conference. Referring to an opinion assertedly offered by a "prominent U.S. international lawyer" in 1945, IZVESTIYA on 4 September declared that the "principle whereby each state possesses a sovereign right in the matter of the dissemination of mass information on its own territory is receiving increasing recognition."

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NOTES

CHINESE LEADERSHIP: NCNA's 12 September account of Mao's meeting with President Pompidou highlighted the new status of Wang Hung-wen and the continuing deflation of the Mao cult. In a greeting without precedent in PRC practice, Wang Hung-wen, identified by his new title as party vice chairman, met Pompidou and Chou En-lai at the entrance to Mao's home. Wang's new role as host for Mao indicates a close association between the aging leader and China's new third-ranking leader.

The NCNA account referred to Mao only as "Chairman", omitting all of the usual honorifics. While some diminution in honorifics had been signaled by the NCNA account of a Mao meeting with Chinese-American doctors on 2 August which designated Mao "leader of the Chinese people" instead of "great leader of the Chinese people," tenth congress documents had used the "great leader" formulation several times. The new formulation omitted the phrase entirely.

Pompidou's 11 September arrival in Peking was the occasion for NCNA's first non-stroke order listing of tenth Politburo members, placing Yao Wen-yuan above Li Hsien-nien and Wu Te. Yao ranked above Li in the last Politburo and his retention of this position might also indicate that although his mentor Chiang Ching failed to reach the top rungs of the new Politburo, she still retains her rank above other ordinary members of the Politburo.

CCP STATISTICS: The Wuhan radio on 28 August revealed that in Hupeh 82 percent of the 300,000 party members chosen since the ninth congress are under 35 years of age and that 20 percent are women. If national figures follow the same lines in proportion to Hupeh's population, some six to seven million new members have been chosen since 1969 and significant progress has been made in bringing "millions of successors" into the party. According to tenth party congress documents there are now 27 million members of the Chinese Communist party, up from 17 million members in the early sixties before the decimations of the cultural revolution.

PRC PROVINCIAL LEADERSHIP: Shantung's second secretary Yuan Sheng-ping, dropped from the central committee by the tenth congress and out of public view since June, has been purged. A provincial broadcast on 10 September identified Pai Ju-ping,

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formerly a provincial deputy secretary, as second secretary. Pai had been named a full member of the tenth central committee. The broadcast also quoted from a speech by provincial chief Yang Te-chih in which he alluded to recent provincial problems, warning specifically against "getting entangled in settling old scores" and avoiding "recklessly using such slogans as 'tie in both the higher and lower levels.'" He also seemed to refer to the Yuan affair in echoing Chou En-lai's political report that "certain wrong tendencies" exist and that it is necessary to "correct the shortcomings and mistakes with regard to our leadership."

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MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 3 - 9 SEPTEMBER 1973

Moscow (2968 items)

China	(13%)	8%
[CCP 10th Congress	(2%)	3%]
4th Nonaligned Summit	(2%)	8%
Conference, Algiers		
DPRK National Day	(--)	6%
Bulgarian National Day	(--)	5%
Afro-Asian Writers	(1%)	5%
Conference, Alma-Ata		
Vietnam	(5%)	4%

Peking (1050 items)

Domestic Issues	(57%)	45%
[CCP 10th Congress	(37%)	40%]
Tricontinental Table	(15%)	17%
Tennis Tournament,		
Peking		
4th Nonaligned Summit	(--)	14%
Conference, Algiers		
DPRK National Day	(--)	5%
Vietnam	(4%)	2%
Cambodia	(4%)	2%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.